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Abstract 
  
 The most common form of warfare so far in the 21st Century has been insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies, types of warfare which are particularly challenging for industrialized 
Western nations to wage effectively. This paper identifies six factors of primary importance 
which form the key to a successful counterinsurgency campaign. These factors are legitimacy, 
clarity, beneficial geopolitical factors, restraint, intellectual understanding, and an enduring 
commitment. This paper argues that these factors must all be present for a counterinsurgency 
campaign to succeed, and argues that without these factors being accounted for a 
counterinsurgency will fail. The British humanitarian intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 and 
their subsequent counterinsurgency campaign is here considered as a type case study to illustrate 
the importance of these factors in waging a successful counterinsurgency campaign.  
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FORWARD 
 My interest in Sierra Leone first arose when I lived in that country for five months while 
working for the humanitarian organization Mercy Ships when I was 19, from July – December 
2011. I found the country and its people to be absolutely fascinating. The people of Sierra Leone 
are some of the kindest, warmest, and most welcoming found on the planet, yet an okada rider 
traversing downtown Freetown fifteen years after the end of the civil war will still see buildings 
pockmarked by bullets, roads where mines were once planted, and individuals with their hands 
or feet missing, victims of the cruel deprivations of the Revolutionary United Front, one of the 
most brutal insurgent groups to ever exist and the primary rebel faction throughout the decade of 
civil war.1 Since I returned from that trip in mid-2012 I have stayed in touch with friends from 
sweet Salone (the name of the country in Krio, the dominant creole tongue) and focused much of 
my academic research on the area. Additionally, as someone who desires to go into policy 
making one day, I am keenly aware that a knowledge of both insurgency and counterinsurgency 
warfare is crucial to anyone who would one day be involved in nearly any aspect of the nation’s 
foreign affairs in this age of Western interventions in overseas conflicts against less 
technologically equipped foes (the type of enemy who is thus predisposed to wage an 
insurgency). This project has allowed me to marry these two interests—as well as my 
background in both History and Political Science—and contribute to an increasingly important 
body of scholarly and practical knowledge with a conceptual framework which is both 
theoretical and practical. 
   
  
                                                          
1 Okada is the Krio term for “motorcycle taxi.” 
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CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM OF COUNTERINSURGENCY 
 Counterinsurgency is as old as warfare itself. Alexander the Great excelled at it. 
Napoleon failed at it. It has been a dominant theme of warfare for three millennia. In recent years 
fierce debates have been waged in the halls of the power over just how conventional military 
powers should fight insurgencies and just what type of counterinsurgency strategies and tactics 
to implement. At a broader and more conceptual level there has been a discussion about what 
factors are most necessary or predicative of success in counterinsurgency campaigns. 
 One of the most successful and least remembered counterinsurgency operations of the 
last two decades was the British humanitarian intervention in Sierra Leone. Starting in May of 
2000 the British government intervened in Sierra Leone first to evacuate their own citizens and 
then to enforce a peace agreement which the United Nations had been unsuccessfully trying to 
implement since it was signed by the warring factions in July 1999.2  
 Initially hailed as a successful example of the benefits a twenty-first century humanitarian 
intervention in the vein as advocated by Tony Blair and laid out by that British Prime Minister in 
his famous Chicago speech, the operation in Sierra Leone was soon forgotten in the aftermath of 
the September 11th attacks, the start of the Global War on Terror, and the subsequent Anglo-
American invasion of Iraq in 2003.3  The questions raised by this operation and explored by this 
paper are important and pertinent in this day and age, a day and age in which counterinsurgency 
campaigns and nation building techniques have become points of emphasis for many Western 
militaries, and have been commonly executed in operations in developing nations around the 
globe. 
                                                          
2 Crawford Young, The Postcolonial State in Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960-2010 (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 257-258. 
3 "Blair: The Inside Story." BBC News. February 22, 2007. Accessed April 11, 2016. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/6361771.stm.  
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 Since the fall of the Soviet Union there have been very few cases of conventional warfare 
either among Western powers or between them and other states. Instead the last decades of the 
20th century and the first decades of the 21st century have seen a myriad of counterinsurgency 
campaigns, as soldiers of various Western powers—most notably France, the United States, and 
Great Britain—have been deployed to a variety of foreign locales to assist host governments 
doing battle with native insurgencies, with these operations generally being presented to the 
electorate as ethical and necessary humanitarian interventions.  
 These counterinsurgency campaigns have met with mixed success. In Iraq and 
Afghanistan the United States appears to have failed once more at counterinsurgency, though not 
quite as badly as in Vietnam. In different parts of Francophonie Africa the French have fared 
rather better, maintaining several successful humanitarian interventions which involved limited 
counterinsurgency campaigns in their former colonies. The British were quite successful in 
Sierra Leone but less so in Iraq, where they assisted the Americans in their doomed effort to 
effect regime change. It is the British humanitarian intervention and subsequent 
counterinsurgency/peacekeeping operation which this paper will be concerned with examining. 
These campaigns are the focus of this paper because they have been underexplored in American 
literature—especially in comparison with American counterinsurgency campaigns in places like 
Vietnam and the Philippines—and because the British and these operations in particular offer an 
excellent study for how to wage and win a counterinsurgency campaign. This paper aims to 
propose a simple list of factors whose presence must be there to determine whether or not a 
counterinsurgency campaign will or will not succeed.  
 With that in mind the British experience in Sierra Leone assuredly provides the perfect 
case study for these proposed factors. All of these factors were in place in this campaign and the 
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British did not experience much trouble in succeeding in a very tricky situation. Consequently 
this British case is used because of this perfection; it illustrates a best case scenario for a 
counterinsurgency campaign, and only through recognizing perfection can imperfection be 
revealed. Thus, the very fact that it is the best case scenario for a counterinsurgency campaign is 
what makes it such an excellent exemplar of how the presence of these factors can make or break 
a counterinsurgency/humanitarian intervention before it even begins.   
Organization 
 This paper is organized into several parts. First is a section giving a series of definitions, 
which is followed by a review of the relevant literature, an examination of the six key factors 
which my research has led me to believe are necessary for a counterinsurgency to succeed and 
which were present for the British in Sierra Leone, and a brief historical overview of Sierra 
Leone to place the British intervention in context, including a discussion of the civil war which 
the British intervention halted and the domestic situation in Great Britain leading up to the 
British intervention. After this the body of the paper is concerned with an examination and 
analysis of the British counterinsurgency campaign in Sierra Leone using as its prism and tool of 
analysis the fulfillment of the six key factors listed, and finally some basic recommendations 
from the British campaign which future military leaders battling an insurgency would do well to 
keep in mind (which function as guidelines for future Western humanitarian interventions). 
Definitions 
 Definitions are of crucial importance in any discussion of complex technical mattes, and 
this is no certainly true for the study of military history. Indeed, it might be even truer in the field 
of counterinsurgency, an area of warfare which Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Fred Kaplan 
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has described as “A graduate course in warfare.”4 Below the definitions of some of the basic 
terms which are used consistently throughout the paper are given. Some I have coined myself 
and defined for clarity’s sake and others I have drawn from the appropriate literature, most 
commonly the official doctrines of the different branches of the United States military. 
 This paper is focused on Western powers deploying expeditionary forces abroad in 
counterinsurgency campaigns. Throughout this paper the term intervening state or intervening 
nation will be used to denote the nation sending troops into a different nation for purposes of 
waging a counterinsurgency campaign, while the term host nation or host government will be 
used for the state which is being intervened in and which is host to both the troops of the 
intervening nation and the native insurgency.  
 Any discussion of military matters should include a discussion of the concepts of strategy 
and tactics, as well as some emphasis on the differentiation between these two terms, which are 
often times mangled, jumbled, and used interchangeably by the layman. The United States 
Marine Corps has a published body of doctrine which provides an excellent definition of both of 
these terms. According to the influential Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting 
“strategy focuses directly on policy objectives...[and] applies to peace as well as war.”5 This 
publication also distinguishes between national strategy, “which coordinates and focuses all the 
elements of national power to attain the policy objectives” and military strategy, “which is the 
application of military force to secure the policy objectives.”6 In other words, military strategy is 
a component of an overarching national strategy. An example of this might be that country A has 
a strategy involving controlling the oceans, which requires that country B be invaded. The 
                                                          
4 Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2013), 152. This quote was the inspiration for the title of my paper. 
5 MCDP-1, 28. 
6 MCDP-1, 28. 
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necessity of the invasion is national strategy; the plan to subdue country B is military strategy. 
As Warfighting puts it:  
Military strategy can be thought of as the art of winning wars and securing peace. 
Strategy involves establishing goals, assigning forces, providing assets, and 
imposing conditions on the use of force in theaters of war. Strategy derived from 
political and policy objectives must be clearly understood to be the sole 
authoritative basis for all operations. 7 
 
The importance of the strategic concept for the purposes of this paper is the understanding that 
counterinsurgency is not a national strategy, and though it can function as a core component (or 
perhaps even as the core component) of a military strategy, it is not a stand-alone military 
strategy, but a component, a piece of a larger and more complex puzzle 
 If strategy is the highest level of warfare, tactics is the lowest level. Again, definition 
provided by Warfighting is used:  
Tactics refers to the concepts and methods used to accomplish a particular 
mission in either combat or other military operations... In war, tactics focuses on 
the application of combat power to defeat an enemy force in combat at a 
particular time and place. In noncombat situations, tactics may include the 
schemes and methods by which we perform other missions, such as enforcing 
order and maintaining security during peacekeeping operations. We normally 
think of tactics in terms of combat, and in this context tactics can be thought of as 
the art and science of winning engagements and battles. It includes the use of 
firepower and maneuver, the integration of different arms, and the immediate 
exploitation of success to defeat the enemy. 8 
 
 There is a final level of war which links tactics and strategy, often referred to as the 
operational level of war. There is some controversy among military theorists regarding the actual 
usefulness or even existence of an operational level of warfare, but as the Marines include it and 
because in insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns it is useful to use as a helpful 
visualization of thought, it will be included in this paper. The full definition of the operational 
level of warfare given in Warfighting is as follows:  
                                                          
7 MCDP-1, 28. 
8 MCDP-1, 28-29. 
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The operational level of war links the strategic and tactical levels. It is the use of 
tactical results to attain strategic objectives. The operational level includes 
deciding when, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy in battle—
and when, where, and under what conditions to refuse battle in support of higher 
aims. Actions at this level imply a broader dimension of time and space than 
actions at the tactical level. As strategy deals with winning wars and tactics with 
winning battles and engagements, the operational level of war is the art and 
science of winning campaigns. Its means are tactical results, and its ends are the 
established strategic objectives.9  
 
The Marine Corp manual does explicitly warn future commanders that “the distinctions between 
levels of war are rarely clearly delineated in practice...they are to some extent only a matter of 
scope and scale.”10 As will be seen throughout this paper nowhere is this more true than when it 
comes to insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns.  
 In his book The Insurgents, chronicling the development of the American 
counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Fred 
Kaplan provides a succinct summary syllogism taken from one of General David Petraeus’s 
close advisers, offering the opinion that “[Western powers] shouldn’t engage in 
counterinsurgency unless the government we’re helping is effective and legitimate; a 
government that needs foreign help to fight an insurgency generally isn’t effective or legitimate; 
therefore, we generally shouldn’t engage in counterinsurgency.”11 This is something to be kept in 
mind when considering the strategic background behind counterinsurgency, because no matter 
how good a nation and its military are at counterinsurgency at the tactical or operational level if 
the underlying strategic factors are a net negative (and if the government being listed by the 
intervening nation lacks legitimacy then strategically victory is already nearly impossible) that 
tactical and operational skill will be for naught, because victory is already almost fundamentally 
impossible. 
                                                          
9 MCDP-1, 30. 
10 MCDP-1, 30. 
11 Kaplan 2013, 290. 
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Introduction of Literature Review 
 This project draws from two primary disciplines, history and political science. Because of 
the nature of counterinsurgency itself, however, any true consideration of the subject demands an 
interdisciplinary approach. With that in mind, the literature drawn on for this project is quite 
diverse and varied. The majority of the material analyzed and literature read for this project can 
be grouped into four broad categories: Sierra Leone History and Background, the Civil War and 
British Intervention, Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice, and British Counterinsurgency 
Thought (separate from the second category because there was such a focus to show that the 
British do in fact have a distinct intellectual and practical theory of counterinsurgency). Listed 
below are the primary works of note considered most essential to this paper by the author. 
Literature Review: Sierra Leone History and Background 
 David Harris’s Sierra Leone: A Political History is the best single volume political 
history of Sierra Leone which I have ever had the pleasure of reading. Starting with before the 
British colonialization and working his way through the most recent elections Harris covers the 
entire spectrum of political historical evolution in Sierra Leone. He has an especially detailed 
couple of chapters on the civil war and several other chapters which do not directly mention the 
war but which cover the events of Sierra Leonean history in such detail that it is clear how they 
helped create the conditions which eventually did lead to open war in this state. 
 Sierra Leone: Inside the War: History and Narratives is both an academic history and a 
collection of oral histories by participants in the Sierra Leonean Civil War. It gives an excellent 
overview of the war at both the political and personal levels. It is similar in this way to the 
excellent Black Man’s Grave: Letters from Sierra Leone, but contains more of a focus on the war 
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and the explicit effects of the war, as opposed merely to the experience of living in the country 
while the war was going on. 
 Black Man’s Grave: Letters from Sierra Leone is an amazing yet haunting collection of 
letters and other information from Sierra Leone. Most of the letters are written between two 
former Peace Corps workers, Gary Stewart, who served in the northern Sierra Leonean village of 
Fadugu from 1968 to 1970 and John Amman, who served in Fadugu from 1979 to 1982, and 
their friends from the village. The book provides a fascinating first-hand look at the civil war and 
the initial invasion of the nation by the RUF (which occurred in the vicinity of Fadugu), as well 
as the events which lead up to the invasion. It is not written explicitly about the civil war, but 
does give an excellent account of what it was like to live in the country while the war was going 
on (only the first part of the war occurred where the authors were living). 
 The book Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents Choices after Civil War by 
Dr. Virginia Page Fortna was helpful less for its core argument about peacekeeping as a viable 
strategic reality but rather because it uses Sierra Leone as a case study. This book affords some 
useful insights into the conflict as well as background information on the intervention by the 
British and contains some suggestions for future humanitarian interventions, but it does not delve 
too deeply into the practice of counterinsurgency. This, however, leads to another point: there is 
no one absolutely definitive historical account of the British intervention in Sierra Leone. 
 Another useful (if somewhat lacking in information regarding Sierra Leone specifically) 
primary source is the memoir of Tony Blair, the prime minister of the U.K. (1997-2007) during 
the intervention. Entitled A Journey: My Political Life, it is fairly vague—and as political as a 
political memoir can be—and Blair does not offer a critical appraisal of his own actions or the 
actions of his government. The book does show some of the thinking of the British government 
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during the build up to sending in British troops to a foreign country—such as when it details how 
the Bosnian operation came together—and functions an effective source of evidence for the 
thinking of the British politicians and policymakers at this time.   
 Additionally, Taking Command, the memoirs of General Sir David Richards, the former 
Chief of Staff of the British Army and the man who was actually the commander of the 
intervention effort in Sierra Leone, contains a significant amount of information on the British 
effort in Sierra Leone. Richards walks the reader through the invasion step-by-step, and even 
details his interactions with the media and how he more or less manipulated them in order to get 
his message that the British Army was going to be successful in Sierra Leone across in the most 
effective way possible. 
 Andrew Doran’s Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone is 
the most comprehensive historical chronicle of the initial intervention. The book traces the 
decision making process up until the British troops arrived and then goes over the course of the 
counterinsurgency campaign from there. In particular Doran highlights the importance of the 
planning and thought that went into the primary British intervention operation (Palliser) and he 
does an excellent job of situating the British decision to intervene in the historical context of 
New Labor foreign policy, positioning it as an outgrowth of the success in Bosnia and a 
harbinger of the strong support Prime Minister Blair would give to the American intervention in 
Iraq a few short years later. 
 Both Corporate Wars: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry by P.W. Singer and 
Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World by Guy Arnold deal in large part with Sierra 
Leone and the Sierra Leonean Civil War. This is because the South African private military firm 
Executive Outcomes and the British private military firm Sandline International were both 
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heavily involved in the war, hired by the government of Sierra Leone to help supply the Sierra 
Leone Army with weapons and training and to directly do battle with the RUF. Consequently 
these two books provide an excellent academic examination of a large part of the Civil War and 
the events which occurred leading up to the British intervention, though by the time British 
Royal Marines and SAS Commandos are arriving in Freetown both firms had left the country.  
 Of note is the discussion in both of these works of the controversy surrounding Sandline 
International, its ties to the British government, and the ensuring scandal. In brief, the British 
government was implicated in assisting Sandline circumvent the arms embargo imposed on 
Sierra Leone by the United Nations and pushed for by the British. Normally such actions would 
decrease the legitimacy which a nation might be seen with prior to sending in troops to intervene 
in another nation and start a counterinsurgency campaign. However this actually became a rare 
case of such covert actions actually increasing the intervening state’s legitimacy, as the British 
were able to portray their actions as completely upstanding and moral because they were trying 
to supply the forces battling the rebels, who of course had committed atrocities for several years 
at this point in the conflict. 
Literature Review: Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice 
 The development of the six factors which I have determined are the most integral to 
determining the success or failure of a counterinsurgency has come after over a year of study of 
the subject in preparation for this thesis. Below are the most important of the texts which I have 
pursued over that time regarding both insurgency and counterinsurgency. This is by no means a 
complete list of the texts read, but merely the most important of them. 
 The most useful introductory text to modern warfare and military affairs in general which 
I have come across is Understanding Modern Warfare, a graduate level survey of the field 
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published by Cambridge University Press a few years ago. It provides a cursory introduction to 
counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, but is not intended as an introduction to that 
more complex topic. Instead it is a text meant for someone who has little to no experience with 
military history/theory at all and needs a guide to understanding the terminology and ideas which 
are prominent in this most complex of fields. 
 The most useful introductory text to the field of counterinsurgency for the laymen is 
Robert Kaplan’s The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of 
War. Kaplan, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, writes in a simple and direct manner about 
complex and nuanced theoretical underpinnings of counterinsurgency though and traces the 
intellectual development of the subject. Of note is the extensive access he had to David Petraeus, 
David Kilcullen, John Nagel, and other prominent military leaders and theorists whose names 
will be repeated below and who have been instrumental to the development of the current COIN 
theory dominant in Western military powers today. 
 The key text which has been read by all of those individuals mention in the preceding 
paragraph and incorporated into almost all the modern thinking on the subject of COIN is David 
Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, first released in 1964. David Galula 
was a French colonel whose life almost perfectly prepared him to become one of the world’s 
foremost experts on battling insurgencies. He spent time as a captive of Mao’s guerillas in China, 
as a UN Observer of the Greek Civil War, as an observer of the Malayan Insurgency and the 
Indochina War, and finally as a French commander in the Algerian War. By the time he started 
at Harvard as a Fellow at the Center for International Affairs in 1963 and began his book, Galula 
13 
 
 
 
had already started developing what would become the most influential counterinsurgency 
theory in modern history.12 
 Galula is actually credited with coining the term counterinsurgency. His book 
systematically outlines the requisites for a successful insurgency first, defining the problem 
before proposing a solution. He has a set of case studies of counterinsurgencies which he 
examines before proposing a set of what he terms the “Laws of Counterinsurgency.”  These laws 
are highly population-centric (they revolve around controlling/influencing the civilian population 
of a nation), a factor which would henceforth dominate counterinsurgency theory after 1964. 
Galula’s four laws are that:  
1. Support of the Population Is as Necessary for the Counterinsurgent as the Insurgent. 
2. Support Is Gained Through an Active Minority. 
3. Support from the Population Is Conditional. 
4. Intensity of Efforts and Vastness of Means Are Essential.13 
These laws would form the basis of American counterinsurgency theory as expressed in the 
recent  U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine for counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency (discussed below) as well as in American application of counterinsurgency 
doctrine in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The clear-build-hold strategy advocated by Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice, for example, was directly distilled from Galula’s thought.14 Galula was 
flawed, however, because he did not advocate for restraint  in dealing with civilian populations 
and captured insurgents (he advocated for torture and reprisals among other things) and because 
he focused so much on the population that he did not take other important factors into account, 
such as the legitimacy of the government. 
                                                          
12 Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency ( New York: New  Press, 2013) 26. 
13 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), 55-59. 
14 Gentile, 25. 
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 As noted above, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps published a new doctrine for 
counterinsurgency entitled FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (the FM stands for Field Manual) in 
2006. With contributions and chapters written by thinkers including David Petraeus, David 
Kilcullen, John Nagl, Michèle Flournoy, Conrad Crane, and Sara Sewell, the book was an 
anthology of the best and most relevant thinking on counterinsurgency in the United States. It is 
also probably too population-centric, and it does not provide as much tactical advice or even 
strategic advice to battlefield commanders. It is more a framework or conceptual model for 
thinking about how to wage a counterinsurgency in the 21st century than it is a practical manual. 
However, it is official doctrine of the United States military regarding counterinsurgency and is 
lightyears ahead of anything else the American government has produced in that regard. 
 One of the principle contributors to FM 3-24 was Colonel John Nagl. A West Point 
graduate and Rhodes Scholar who earned his doctorate while at Oxford, Nagl served in both Gulf 
Wars and later became the head of the Center for a New American Security.  Nagl can be seen as 
the Ted Sorenson to David Petraeus’s JFK, as an intellectual blood bank of sorts. His book 
Learning How to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam 
is the single most influential book written on counterinsurgency in the 21st century. Drawing 
inspiration from Galula and T.E. Lawrence (from whose memoirs the title is derived), Nagl turns 
a keen academic eye to the British counterinsurgency operation in Malaya and then contrasts that 
successful British operation to the disaster experienced by America in Vietnam. Much of this 
project’s discussion of British intellectual consideration of counterinsurgency theory and the 
development of a unique British theory of COIN draws on Nagl, but his influence goes well 
beyond just this academic examination of British theory, as he makes recommendations for 
future American campaigns in his book and then played such an integral role in American 
15 
 
 
 
operations in Iraq as both a tactical commander and later on as a senior adviser in the 
government. 
 Another individual who played a large role in the formulation of American 
counterinsurgency theory and its coming of age in Iraq and Afghanistan was Colonel David 
Kilcullen, who was quoted earlier in this paper. A member of the Australian Army, Kilcullen 
was influential in the American military during the conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq. He was 
a major contributor to the COIN field manual and one to the key advisors to the American 
military and civilian command.15 Kilcullen dedicated his professional career to a study of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency and is a major figure in the modern development of 
counterinsurgency theory. He is widely published and I consulted the majority of his works for 
this project. However, the two works of his which played the largest role in this paper were his 
article “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency,” which is actually derived from a 2006 lecture, and 
his book The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.   
 The three pillars provided the original conceptual model which Kilcullen developed for 
counterinsurgency and which he revisited in The Accidental Guerilla three years later in a 
broader format (with case studies provided from modern insurgencies). The titular three pillars 
are Security, Political, and Economic, with a base in Information and all supporting the end goal 
of Control.16 He goes to lengths to make clear that this is, in his words, “a framework, not a 
template.”17 He succeeds in helping to conceptualize counterinsurgency—indeed he is probably 
equal to Nagl as far as influence on current counterinsurgency thought today is concerned—but 
                                                          
15 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 119-120. 
16 David Kilcullen, "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency." Department of the Air Force. September 28, 2016. 
Accessed October 06, 2016. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf. 
17 David Kilcullen, "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency." Department of the Air Force. September 28, 2016. 
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his model does not do enough to do justice to other factors beyond those which are tactical in 
nature. That is where my six factors might be considered a correction to the work done by 
Kilcullen. 
 In his book Kilcullen provides a part-memoir/part-theoretical examination of his own 
experiences waging counterinsurgencies in the Muslim Middle East. In its opening pages 
Kilcullen makes the fascinating observation that “The local fighter is therefore often an 
accidental guerrilla—fighting us because we are in his space, not because he wishes to invade 
ours.”18 While this insight is more applicable for cases which will be touched on but are outside 
the scope of this project (namely Western interventions into the Middle East), it does have some 
applicability to the Sierra Leonean Civil War. The Kamajors who are touched on below (militia 
derived from traditional hunting organizations which arose in response to defend villages after 
the RUF invasion from Liberia) are an exemplar par excellence of an accidental guerilla. These 
rural villagers did not plan on fighting the RUF and only did so after their own space was 
encroached upon.  
 Kilcullen attempts to establish a conceptual framework for what he calls “the current 
pattern of conflict” in regards to insurgencies, as well as to identify what he considers the key 
variants in such conflicts to be. Kilcullen, as will be seen later on, is primarily dealing with 
conflicts in which the intervener lacks broad legitimacy and most of the campaigns in which he 
was involved in did not conform to my own six factor model.  
 The foundations of FM 3-24 were in large part those of Galula updated for the 21st 
century.19 The foundations of the most influential doctrinate publication in the United States 
military, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting (the series which this paper draws 
                                                          
18 Kilcullen 2009, xiv.  
19 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 
(New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 26-27. 
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on to provide definitions of most military terms found in the text), were Sun Tzu and 
Clausewitz.20 On War remains perhaps the most influential book written on the subject in the 
Western canon, and Clausewitz is also a significant figure in the field of counterinsurgency, 
though not as significant as he potentially could have been (his chapter on insurgency is 
incomplete due to his early death).21 He outlines some thoughts on insurgencies and fighting 
them, though he makes the interesting observation that “we consider a general insurrection as 
simply another means of war” and one which does not require too much special treatment.22 
 The best critique of Galula and other “population-centric” counterinsurgent solutions 
which I have seen is actually based on Clausewitzian theory. Written by USMC Captain Brett 
Friedman and published in the peer-reviewed Military Review in 2014, “Creeping Death: 
Clausewitz and Comprehensive Counterinsurgency” does an excellent job of highlighting the 
major issues which the reader of Counterinsurgency War: Theory and Practice would encounter 
and the objections which that reader would likely raise. However that is just what makes this 
article useful, not what makes it fascinating. What makes it fascinating is that Captain Friedman 
critiques the entire academy by saying that in all of the theories out there regarding 
counterinsurgency, “[they] have indeed ignored the portions of the trinity and their interrelated 
nature. Each theory ignores two of the three aspects of the trinity and, furthermore, assumes an 
arbitrary relationship between the enemy, the population, and the political goals of the 
insurgency as a whole that does not exist.”23 Theorists focus solely on their theory and dislike 
looking beyond it for critiques or improvements. This leads to a lack of efficiency. The six 
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factors outlined in this paper are intentionally meant to correct for this arbitrariness in modern 
counterinsurgency thought and theory. These factors are broad enough to cover many areas, 
specific enough to be used for actionable objectives, and interdisciplinary enough to address 
most problems (as opposed to focusing overwhelmingly and cripplingly on only one or two 
factors).  
 The development of my discussion of clarity owes its impetus to the works of Thomas 
Ricks, a former embedded Washington Post reporter in Iraq who was a contributor to the thought 
and work of both Petraeus and Nagl and who is now a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New 
American Security. He wrote two books on the American invasion and subsequent occupation of 
Iraq. The first one, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq is one of the most 
important and influential books for my own thinking which I have ever read. Ricks outlines the 
lack of planning and thought that went into the United States invading Iraq and shows just how 
much the lack of thought in the opening days of the war negated the years of thought which 
would eventually go into trying to first win and later just get out of the war in Iraq. This point is 
expanded in Ricks’ book The Generals, which examines the structure and hierarchy of American 
command from before the Second World War and up through the present day. A point which is 
made over and over again is that a lack of clarity and planning will inevitably lead to failure in a 
counterinsurgency campaign. Details which can be overlooked in a conventional war when a 
state is the most powerful on Earth can lead to defeat when it is an unconventional war that state 
is trying to win.  
 The second book Ricks wrote on the Iraq War, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and 
the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008, is a great look at the application of 
counterinsurgency theory in the 21st century and specifically during “the Surge” which occurred 
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in the waning days of the Bush Administration, when 20,000 more American troops were 
deployed to Iraq. Ricks does an excellent job of differentiating between tactical and strategic 
success in The Gamble when examining the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq under 
General Petraeus. Again this speaks to the point developed in this paper regarding the six key 
factors of counterinsurgency, especially the factor of clarity: there must be a clear strategic and 
tactical purpose to every action taken in defeating an insurgency, but the strategic purpose must 
always come first. Too often strategic considerations are sacrificed for short term tactical 
successes, with predictably poor results over the long term. 
 The other book which really shaped my perception of the importance of clarity and 
commitment was General H.R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert 
McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam. McMaster masterfully 
presents a story of infighting, deception, and general incoherence at the highest levels of civilian 
and military command during Vietnam. As even the most cursory student of history knows, the 
Vietnam War was a disaster for the United States, and America’s lack of a willingness to commit 
to any strategy, and even worse the lack of any sort of clear strategy at all, are among the 
primary reasons Vietnam was such a disaster. This book is also relevant for background and 
importance of its author: it is an outgrowth of McMaster’s PhD. dissertation at the University of 
North Carolina, but the academic also command a regiment in Iraq and today is one of the 
leading lights in the intellectual and strategic development of the United States Army. Like Nagl, 
Kilcullen, Galula, and Petraeus, McMaster is soldier-scholar who demonstrates the necessary 
combination of an aptitude for violence, a keen intelligence, and an ability to think critically 
demanded of a leader who would be successful in waging a counterinsurgency. 
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 Historian Russell Weigley’s groundbreaking The American Way of War: A History of 
United States Military Strategy and Policy is also worth mentioning because it serves as an 
excellent baseline from which to examine not only American but more broadly all conventional 
thought in regards to guerilla warfare. The Americans in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan 
reacted in broadly similar ways to the guerrilla assaults, lacking restraint and pursuing self-
defeating strategies. Weigley does a good job of showing where the United States has done an 
excellent job in waging war (overwhelming firepower and technology, preserving American 
lives) and not as good of a job (areas including tactical/strategic innovation and adaptation to 
asymmetrical foes). 
 The leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, was educated in guerilla warfare at camps in 
Libya, as was his biggest supporter, Charles Taylor.  The works they would have encountered 
there would likely have been Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare and Mao Tse-tung’s  
essay "On Guerrilla Warfare" (and perhaps his less well-known “On Protracted War,” a series of 
lectures given in 1938 outlining his proposal for Chinese resistance to the superior but 
conventional Japanese Army). Of course these works are more important than just for their direct 
connection to this project: they are arguably the most influential books on guerilla warfare ever 
published. To paraphrase Sunzi, know thy enemy and know thy self. Any study of a 
counterinsurgency should consider the thought of the insurgent and guerilla theory as well.  
 The focus of Che is on the guerilla as a ‘social reformer.’ To him every effort must be 
made to ally with the population. In Galula’s population-centric model it is imperative that the 
counterinsurgent treat the population well; however if they do not they still have a chance at 
victory. For Che’s guerrilla however, there is no chance of victory if the population is mistreated: 
without their support the guerrilla will not achieve anything other than defeat. Che outlines both 
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tactical and strategic considerations for the guerilla to consider, all drawn heavily from his 
experience in Cuba (when he was actually in Africa, it should be noted, Che did not fair nearly as 
well as he did in the Caribbean). Mao is similar in this regard. He places paramount importance 
on the interactions of the guerilla with the population. Tactics—hit-and-run assaults, supply-line 
ambushes, etc.—are important, but the focus must be on the (rural) population and ensuring that 
they stay loyal and on the side of the guerilla fighter. 
 It is interesting to note that while they followed much of the tactical advice given in these 
two books, the guerillas of the RUF blatantly disregarded what are arguably the more important 
directives of these two Communists: do everything in your power to help and not hurt the 
population. Both Che and Mao would have been horrified at the RUF’s actions in regards to the 
population, not because they were averse to cruelty or violence but because these actions were 
strategically inexcusable and led to the alienation of the population, which in turn served to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the British when they arrived in the country. There were certainly 
legitimate grievances for the RUF to rebel against, but their actions undercut any legitimacy they 
might have had, and in an insurgency/counterinsurgency struggle legitimacy cuts both ways, and 
is crucial to both sides. 
 G.L. Lamborn is a retired CIA officer whose book Arms of Little Value: The Challenge of 
Insurgency and Global Instability in the Twenty-First Century is an overlooked gem of the 
growing field pf counterinsurgency studies. Lamborn argues that the issue with COIN at the end 
of the day is a cultural one, and that American troops struggle with counterinsurgency because 
they are unable to understand the cultural and economic factors which lead to an insurgency in 
the first place. He argues that all of the fancy theoretical thinking in the world cannot help 
soldiers from the West defeat an insurgency if they do not make an effort to understand the 
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cultural background of those people whom they are fighting. Lamborn uses many of the classic 
examples of insurgency and counterinsurgency as case studies, but from a unique and intriguing 
cultural angle in pursuit of his argument. His argument is one which I am sympathetic too, but 
not quite convinced of. While it is certainly true that the basics of a culture need to be known, I 
do not think that true cultural understanding of the enemy is of particular relevance at the 
strategic level, as Lamborn maintains.  However, the second argument of the book is something 
with which I wholeheartedly agree, which is that often in failing to understand the root causes of 
instability and insurgency in foreign lands Western powers act in ways which are not perceived 
as legitimate, critically undermining their ability to wage a successful insurgency from very 
beginning. This argument fits in perfectly with my own reasoning regarding the importance of 
legitimacy and my inclusion of legitimacy as one of the crucial six factors which will make or 
break the success of a counterinsurgency campaign. 
 P.W. Dixon’s The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern 
Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan is actually a collection of essays by experts in the field on the 
relevance of past British conflicts on their counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(where the British are widely perceived as having failed at effective counterinsurgency). Of 
particular note, some of the scholars in this book argue that there is no intrinsic British aptitude 
for counterinsurgency and that the existing British doctrine is not unique, an argument which 
challenges my own later point about the importance of having existing intellectual background 
with counterinsurgency. However, as I argue that the importance is not in having an exact 
doctrine (though that is of course important for purposes of clarity) but having learned 
experience and knowing that there are different demands placed on the counterinsurgent than on 
the conventional soldier. 
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 John Newsinger is a British Marxist and ardent anti-imperialist whose chronicle of 
British counterinsurgency operations, aptly titled British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to 
Northern Ireland, in many ways reflects that stance. That stance is also reflected in in the driving 
argument of the work, which is that “British success...was dependent not on any supposed 
military process, but on the ability to establish a large enough political base among sections of 
the local inhabitants prepared to support and assist in the defeat of the insurgents.”24 What 
Newsinger fails to realize with this argument is that he is not arguing anything strange to a 
counterinsurgent theorist: the population and the political base are major elements of any 
counterinsurgency theory. Even more so these things form the basis of British counterinsurgency 
theory more than any other comparable Western power’s counterinsurgency theory (though after 
Petraeus, Nagl, and Kilcullen American theory has shifted to being more population-centric than 
British theory). Thus in the end Newsinger is unknowingly arguing not against but actually for a 
distinct British method or theory of counterinsurgency.  
 The Counterinsurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare by Andrew 
Mumford takes the same tact. The author argues that while a unique British take on 
counterinsurgency doctrine may have existed in the past that doctrine completely failed to live up 
to expectations in Afghanistan and Iraq. I agree with him that a unique British doctrine and 
experience with counterinsurgency existed, but I would disagree that its existence or lack of 
applicability were to blame for defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead it was a combination of 
other factors which were to some extent outside the control of the British Army and political 
structure, as well as a lack of the other five factors discussed and argued for in this paper. 
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 Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency: The British Army and Small War Strategy 
Since World War II by Victoria Nolan is an excellent examination of the British approach to 
counterinsurgency and a study of the experiences of the past affect the education and focus of the 
present and future. More than just a study of British counterinsurgency it goes on to examine the 
entire leadership and organizational culture of the British Army and how the British experience 
with counterinsurgency operations affected and shaped that culture. These things were important 
to success in Sierra Leone, where the unique training and experience of the British Army 
prepared them for a counterinsurgency in ways which other Western militaries would not have 
been. 
 The Media and International Security, is a collection of essays edited by Dr. Stephen 
Badsey, a professor of military history at the University of Wolverton in the United Kingdom. 
Arising from an academic conference at the British Military Academy at Sandhurst in September 
1995, these essays represent the combined conclusions of British policy makers, media, military 
and scholarly types. In other words, this primary source documents much of the thinking about 
framing conflicts and dealing with the media during interventions by the policymakers and 
military officers who would actually be doing this a few years later in Sierra Leone, as well as 
the media people who would be reporting on the conflict itself. It contains multiple references 
throughout to the American experience in Somalia, and does suggest that there was a link 
between the experience of the United States with the media in Somalia and the actions taken by 
the British military and government in dealing with the media in Sierra Leone seven years later.  
The Six Core Factors ‘Model’ 
 As I researched the group of military operations (Basilica, Palliser, Barras, Silkman, 
Maidenly, Keeling, Vosper, and Vela, and continuing into the Ebola crisis with Operation 
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Gritrock) which taken together constitute the British military intervention into Sierra Leone, I 
was also busy researching the various theories of counterinsurgency and the different factors 
which thinkers have maintained go into a successful counterinsurgency since antiquity.25  In the 
course of my research I have come to the conclusion that there are six key factors which must be 
in place for a nation to wage a successful humanitarian intervention and counterinsurgency 
campaign. These six crucial factors are legitimacy, clarity, beneficial geopolitical factors, 
restraint, intellectual understanding, and an enduring commitment.  
 Legitimacy is a complex factor. This factor encompasses the legitimacy of the 
intervention force in the eyes of the international community, the citizens of both the host nation 
and the intervening nation, and the legitimacy of the host government. The host nation 
government and the host nation citizens are not synonymous. For example the Americans in Iraq 
were—pro facie at least—seen as legitimate by the Iraqi government, but not by large segments 
of the Iraqi people (nor by much of the international community).26 Likewise, many Americans 
saw neither the Iraqi government nor the American-led expeditionary force as legitimate.27 A 
lack of legitimacy in any of these areas can crucially hamstring a counterinsurgency campaign 
and doom it to failure almost from the start. The discussion of this concept in the paper will 
focus on how legitimacy was a key point of the British success in Sierra Leone and that the 
groundwork to demonstrate that this was a legitimate action was established before the first 
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British paratroopers arrived in Freetown, and established on a local, national (in the U.K as well 
as Sierra Leone), and international level. 
 Clarity is the second factor, and it also encompasses multiple interlocking concepts. An 
intervention must be clear in its aims and objectives, the rules of engagement and the reason 
behind them must be clear to all members of the intervening force, and the purpose of the initial 
intervention and any subsequent military campaign must be made clear to the troops engaged in 
the campaign, the population back home, the citizens of the host nation, and the international 
community. The plan of engagement must be clear at all levels of policy and decision making for 
each step of the intervention, from the moment that the troops touch down to the moment that 
they leave, however many days, months, or years in the future that might be. A lack of clear 
planning is the quickest and easiest way to hamstring a humanitarian intervention and military 
campaign. 
 There two similar geopolitical factors which must be in place for a counterinsurgency 
operation to succeedThe first of these is that there cannot be any bordering regions which have 
governments friendly to the insurgents. If a bordering country does favor the insurgency that 
state must be brought to heel by whatever means are necessary, either militarily or otherwise. If 
there is a cross-border safe-haven for insurgents to retreat to and train in than it will be difficult 
to impossible to ever fully eradicate them, no matter how legitimate the counterinsurgent force is 
seen and how committed it is to eventual victory. Second and in the same manner there cannot be 
a porous border; even if a neighboring state is not friendly to the guerillas but is unable to secure 
its border and consequently implicitly enables a continuous flow of weapons, ammunition, 
volunteers, and funds to the insurgents it can drag out a counterinsurgency campaign to a point 
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where the insurgents can force a stalemate, and thus a victory. Borders must be closed to outside 
aid if an intervening counterinsurgent force is going to defeat a counterinsurgency. 
 Intellectual understanding refers to the necessity for these broad but core factors being 
understood by the warfighters at every level, as well as other more counterinsurgency specific 
techniques and tactics. Waging and winning a counterinsurgency campaign requires a level of 
intuitive and thinking which is neither possessed nor taught by many militaries around the globe. 
The British benefitted in this regarded because they were already in possession of a large body of 
national counterinsurgency doctrine stemming from their centuries long experience of battling 
insurgents during the heyday of the British Empire and in the post-colonial world. This doctrine 
was in many ways able to act as, if not a guiding hand, at least a strong historical experience 
from which to draw upon and guide British actions in Sierra Leone; contrast this with the 
Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan (to say nothing of Vietnam) where a coherent 
counterinsurgency doctrine had to be built on the fly and almost from scratch.28 
 Restraint of force flows from an intellectual understanding of the needs of 
counterinsurgent warfare. Restraint is called for because the population is often the center of 
gravity for both an insurgency and a counterinsurgency. To end an insurgency requires that the 
people actively support the counterinsurgents, and if those troops are killing the people that 
simply will not happen. Thus restraint is called for in every action taken by the troops fighting 
the insurgency. If the troops are attacked, they must be judicious to an extreme in returning fire. 
The last thing which is to be desired is civilian casualties, because they can turn an entire 
populace against a counter-insurgent force with rapacity unmatched. Likewise, all strikes against 
insurgents—even individual high value targets—must be carefully weighed against the 
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likelihood of collateral damage, and especially of civilian casualties. A drone strike might kill a 
regional commander and ten insurgents, but if it leads to another twenty volunteers joining up 
with the insurgency it has been a net negative to the cause of the counter-insurgent. 
 The final crucial factor to a successful counterinsurgency is commitment.  Commitment 
might actually be the most important of the factors discussed here. A nation or a coalition of 
nations intervening in a region and waging a counterinsurgency must make it clear that they are 
there for the long haul. Insurgents do not have to win to achieve victory; they must merely fight 
the counterinsurgent to a stalemate, until that state and its people grow tired of war. Thus it is 
crucial that if the intervening nation is going to commit to a counterinsurgency campaign that 
they be prepared to be committed for at least ten to fifteen years, if not longer. The average 
successful counterinsurgency campaign lasts well over a decade, and as in Sierra Leone the 
campaign can easily continue for years even after the actual fighting has stopped.29 
 These are the crucial factors which must be acknowledged and acted upon to achieve a 
successful outcome in a counterinsurgency campaign. As will be seen in this paper these factors 
were all in place in the British intervention and subsequent counterinsurgency campaign in Sierra 
Leone, which this thesis examines in some detail, showing how it was these six factors which led 
to the British triumph.  
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CHAPTER 2: SIERRA LEONE AND THE SIX CORE FACTORS 
 All of these thoughts and ideas discussed above have contributed to the advancement of 
the theory of what counterinsurgency warfare is, and what it is not. COIN is not a cure all, it is 
not a comprehensive strategy, or even a strategy at all. It is a tool in the strategist tool belt, and 
one which must be used with care. It is perhaps best said to be a comprehensive operational tool. 
It is strategic in one way because it requires patience and commitment from the highest-echelon 
of command to work. However, it is played out in the day-to-day minutiae of the solider at the 
tactical level and requires adherence and discipline not only from generals and colonels, but also 
from privates and corporals. Below the counterinsurgency campaign waged by the British in 
Sierra Leone—a campaign in which the actual combat was relatively brief, but the actual 
commitment was not—is considered as a kind of case study, to show just how a successful 
counterinsurgency campaign can be waged as part of a larger strategic humanitarian intervention. 
Historical Background 
 To understand the events of the Sierra Leonean insurgency and the subsequent British 
intervention some background is given below on the history of Sierra Leone as an independent 
nation, the lead up to the Sierra Leonean Civil War, the Civil War itself, and the start of the 
British intervention. Sierra Leone as a formally came into existence as an independent state on 
April 27, 1961, following several months of negotiations between the British Empire and leader 
of the movement for Sierra Leonean independence, Sir Milton Margai, the man who would 
become the first Prime Minister of the new nation.30 As part of the famous “winds of change” 
sweeping across the African continent as Britain freed her former colonial holdings, Sierra Leone 
remained within the British Commonwealth, and the freshly-minted nation maintained close ties 
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with its former imperial overlord.31 The new nation was a parliamentary democracy, retaining 
the system of rule which had been used by the British themselves, and the first elections were 
held in May 1962. In a disturbing sign of things to come, however, these first few years of 
freedom and the early elections were marred by the imprisonment of several opposition party 
leaders on what were essentially trumped up and politically motivated charges as Margai’s SLPP 
Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) cruised to several easy wins in both Parliament and the 
Executive Branch in the early years of the new republic.32 
 Still, the first five years of the Republic of Sierra Leone would prove to be the most 
democratic and peaceful of its history. In 1964 Prime Minister Sir Milton Margai, the former 
leader of the independence movement and one of Africa’s premier statesmen, died at home quite 
unexpectedly and with no plan of succession in place.33 On his death his brother, Sir Albert 
Margai was elected to his position on the strength of his last name, but, unfortunately, Sir Albert 
did not possess the same political gifts his brother did. Riots broke out against Margai in 1967 as 
rumors of corruption and embezzlement arose in the local press. In response, Margai declared a 
state of emergency across the entire country and called out the military to effectively impose 
martial law to shut down the riots. Surprisingly, Margai himself did not use the opportunity to 
seize absolute power. His action did, however, set a precedent for the early resort to a use of 
military power and martial law in times of political unrest, a precedent which would be copied 
by future—and less scrupulous—national leaders. Elections were due to be held in 1967, and in 
spite of the rioting and military presence Margai allowed them to proceed.34 Proceed they did, 
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and Margai’s SLPP was beaten out by the All People’s Congress (APC) at the ballot box. The 
APC was led by an activist named Siaka Stevens, who had been one of the opposition leaders 
imprisoned by Margai in the first elections after independence.  
 Before Stevens could even assume the duties of Prime Minister, a coup was launched by 
several generals to prevent him from taking his rightfully-elected place. Stevens was placed 
under house arrest, only for a counter-coup to be launched days later. This counter-coup 
attempted to place Sierra Leone under the rule of an absolutist military junta, but, within a year, 
yet another coup was launched, which led to Stevens finally being made head of state of the less-
and-less democratic looking Republic of Sierra Leone in 1968.35 The ascendancy of Stevens in 
1968 marked the functional end of democracy in Sierra Leone. 
 Stevens quickly set about turning Sierra Leone into a one-party state, consolidating 
authority around the Executive Branch and creating the extra-constitutional office of President, 
mostly in the name of fighting against coups both real and imagined.36 By 1978 the APC was the 
only legal political organization within Sierra Leone, and Stevens would rule the nation with a 
totalitarian iron fist until he retired to his Freetown estate in 1985.37 He would die peacefully in 
1988, but his actions while in power would set the stage for one of the most vicious and violent 
wars in modern history, the Sierra Leonean Civil War. The causes of the war were both 
dizzyingly complex (when considered from a political standpoint) and frightfully simple (when 
considered from an economic standpoint). 
 Things deteriorated quickly upon Stevens’s retirement. First, he was replaced by his 
hand-picked successor, a man more known for kowtowing to Stevens rather than for any great 
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skill or experience in governing a nation, one Major General Joseph Momoh.38 Predictably, the 
results were negative. The Momoh Administration was characterized by a perceived—and likely 
real— increase in oppression and corruption by many Sierra Leoneans, and both the new 
President and his advisers were deeply unpopular. Mounting protests lead to Momoh sacking 
several of his cabinet ministers and launching a formal anti-corruption governmental initiative 
entitled the Code of Conduct for Political Leaders and Public Servants, but this had no practical 
effect either on corruption or on public disgust with their authoritarian leader.39 
 Under mounting pressure from international actors and disillusioned citizens alike, 
Momoh attempted to tamp down on both groups by announcing in 1990 that Parliament and the 
APC were going to reappraise the 1978 constitution  created by Stevens, which had formalized 
the one-party state arrangement which had existed in Sierra Leone for the previous twelve years. 
After some deliberation the APC Executive voted to redraw the constitution and allow for multi-
party elections. However, international observers and citizens alike did not believe that Momoh 
and his APC were serious about true electoral and constitutional reform, and the situation in 
Sierra Leone continued to deteriorate. In 1991 the mounting tension and pressure came to a head 
and the situation erupted into a full-blown civil war. 
 But, this civil war was not as domestic as the designation “civil war” would lead one to 
believe. Sierra Leone had long been a member of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), and ECOWAS had recently intervened in the neighboring Liberia, which 
was in the midst of its own civil war at the time. President Momoh had committed some troops 
to this intervention and also allowed ECOWAS forces to use Sierra Leonean territory as a 
staging ground from which to enter Liberia. In retaliation for this—and in an attempt to raise 
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money for his armies, whose treasury had been running dry—the world’s most notorious warlord 
(and war criminal) at that time, Liberia’s Charles Taylor, helped arm and train a group of exiled 
Sierra Leoneans who desired to start a rebellion.40 Calling themselves the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) and led by Foday Sankoh, a former Sierra Leonean Army corporal who had trained 
with Taylor at a guerilla training camp in Gaddafi’s Libya during the Cold War, the rebels 
invaded Sierra Leone on March 23, 1991, kicking off one of the most vicious and brutal wars in 
modern history.41 
 The initial reaction of the Momoh government to this rebellion was sluggish, and the 
RUF made rapid gains across the countryside. They quickly overran large swathes of the eastern 
and southern portions of the country, capturing many of the famed diamond mines of Sierra 
Leone. However, the offense began to stall out due to a combination of military action by the 
Sierra Leonean Army and the distraction of Sankoh and the RUF High Command, as they started 
to focus on enriching themselves through the diamond mines rather than actually trying to 
overthrow the government. Indeed it would quickly become apparent to all watching that the 
RUF had no governing philosophy or even a legitimate grievance with the ruling APC, but 
instead existed primarily to enrich its leaders and send tribute money to Charles Taylor to 
support his continuing civil war in Liberia.  
 As the situation began to get worse and worse politically and strategically for the Momoh 
Administration, a group of young army officers determined that the time was right to engage in 
what was quickly becoming a cornerstone of Sierra Leonean politics: launching a coup. Citing 
mismanagement of the war as their primary reason for doing so, on April 29, 1992 they stuck. 
Led by Captain Valentine Strasser, the plotters quickly ousted Momoh (who was sent into exile 
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in Guinea) and established themselves in office, claiming that they were fighting on the behalf of 
the people. This claim was quickly disproved by the establishment not of a democratic republic, 
the restoration of voting rights, or anything that could be characterized as being done on the 
behalf of the people, but instead of the installation of military junta christened the National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and headed up by Strasser, who would become the world’s 
youngest head of state at the age of only 25.42  
 Strasser would prove to be an ineffective leader. During his time in power little was done 
to stop the RUF, who continued their lethargic advance across the country. Strasser also was 
rather undemocratic as president and displayed little desire to reform the government or do 
anything to help the impoverished citizenry and the swelling population of refugees pouring into 
Freetown in an attempt to escape the cruelty of the RUF. Neither winning the war or helping the 
poor is a terrible combination for the head of state who desires to stay in office, especially during 
wartime, and Strasser was no exception. He was taken out of office as he had come into it, being 
overthrown in a coup by members of the NPRC in 1996, and subsequently exiled to Guinea just 
at Stevens and Momoh had been before him.43 
 The leaders of this coup installed General Julius Bio as head of state. Bio, who had, 
amusingly enough, been recently promoted into his position by the now former President 
Strasser, surprised many by holding elections quickly after coming into power.44 These elections 
led to the first non-military non-APC government coming into office in Sierra Leone since 1967, 
as the SLPP won most of the parliamentary seats as well as the Presidency, led by party leader 
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Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.45 Kabbah promised to end the war and opened up negotiations with the 
RUF and Sankoh. Things seemed like they might be looking up for Sierra Leone, even as the 
negotiations failed to produce anything substantive. 
 Then disaster struck again. A year after his election President Kabbah was disposed in a 
military coup and sent into exile in Guinea. The coup leader, Major General Johnny Paul 
Koroma, had no legitimate grievance and was not particularly concerned about the welfare of the 
nation, but merely desired to seize power, and so he did. Installing himself as the new head of 
state and forming the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) as the new governing body, 
Koroma would prove to be perhaps the most damaging leader in Sierra Leonean history. He 
immediately suspended the constitution, shut down all non-government radio stations, and 
instituted martial law. If the absolute suspension of democracy and human rights was not bad 
enough, Koroma also invited the RUF to join him as part of the government. Ostensibly as part 
of the peace talks, the AFRC-RUF proved to be nothing more than a murderous kleptocracy, 
enforcing no laws but instead presiding over a state which was primarily characterized by rape, 
robbery, and the accumulation of wealth for the respective leaders of the two former foes, united 
by their greed and appetite for destruction.46  
 Faced with this growing regional threat to stability Nigeria sent troops into the nation 
under the banner of ECOMOG, and their force quickly ousted Koroma and the rebels from 
power. Another peace agreement was signed which brought the democratically elected President, 
Kabbah, back into office with Foday Sankoh as a member of his cabinet. This tense peace lasted 
for a year before Sankoh decided to make another play for power, kidnapping several Westerners 
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and ordering his RUF troops (which had not been disbanded as part of the peace treaty) to march 
on Freetown. 
 At this point things were in a state of disaster. Gangs of bandits roamed this territory, 
owing loyalty to no own except for their own pockets. The government did not function, and 
human rights abuses were rife. Aside from rape and murder—both of which happened at a 
brutally high level—Sierra Leone was known in the international community for two war crimes 
in particular: amputation of the limbs of their opponents and innocent bystanders alike, and the 
use of child soldiers. First pioneered in West Africa by Sankoh’s old friend Charles Taylor in 
Liberia, the RUF in particular employed thousands of boys as young as six as soldiers for its 
forces. Kidnapped from their homes (often after being forced to execute their own family 
members), hopped up on drugs, and given a rife, these gangs of children were hideously 
mistreated, abused and used as cannon fodder for the rebel advance.47 
 This then was the atmosphere of Sierra Leone at the time which the British intervention 
occurred. The situation in Sierra Leone is, however, only half the story and only half of the 
reason that her former colonial overlord decided to send in troops. To gain a fuller picture of the 
context in which the British government decided to send the military into a West African country 
thousands of miles away from Britain, some background must also be given as to what was 
going on in British politics at the time. Britain was experiencing the dawn of the so-called 
“Liberal golden age,” and the start of the long tenure of the polarizing Tony Blair as the British 
Prime Minister. Blair’s personality and understanding of international affairs would largely 
shape the course of recent British history, most notably with regard to Iraq and the British 
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support of America’s massive intervention in the Middle East. It was Blair who greenlighted the 
Sierra Leonean intervention.48 
 Tony Blair was first elected as Prime Minister in 1997 (and would serve in that capacity 
until he stepped down in 2007). He was the youngest prime minister in Britain since 1812.49 
Blair’s platform contained a variety of different planks grouped under the heading “New 
Labour,” and one of the most prominent of these planks was his championship of what he termed 
an “ethical foreign policy” or ‘Doctrine of the International Community,” a doctrine most clearly 
outlined in the famous speech Blair gave to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 1999, 
which identified five principles of this new foreign policy, quickly dubbed the Blair Doctrine.50 
The hallmark of this foreign policy approach once Blair gained office was a willingness to order 
British troops into action around the world not for political or economic reasons but instead to 
right wrongs and enforce the correct moral actions that Blair and the British determined were 
necessary. Indeed, Blair’s policy of ethical interventions and decision making helps historians 
account for the fact that he ordered British troops into action more times than any other prime 
minister in British history, before or since.51 His willingness to do so in order to end atrocities 
and support human rights was nowhere more evident than in Sierra Leone, which as seen above 
was a hotbed of brutal human rights violations. 
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Introduction of Analysis 
 This was the situation when the British arrived in Sierra Leone. The country had a history 
of corruption and ineffective at best government, while the British government was looking to 
launch a new interventionist foreign policy for the 21st century.  The counterinsurgency which 
the British waged is used as the exemplar for the six factors which I have identified as the key 
factors which need to be in place for a counterinsurgency campaign to be successful, each of 
which is listed below and will be examined and laid out, before being analyzed in the context of 
the British intervention into Sierra Leone. 
Legitimacy 
           Legitimacy is the first factor which will be examined. Legitimacy is crucial to waging a 
counterinsurgency.  The citizens of the host country as well as the citizens of the intervening 
nation must view the counterinsurgency campaign as legitimate. If either of these groups of 
citizens do not view the counterinsurgency operation—or rather more broadly the war in which 
that campaign is a part—as being legitimate than support will erode and then vanish, leaving 
decision makers with the difficult choice between continuing an unpopular war or withdrawing 
altogether.    
 An excellent example of this is the United States in Vietnam. The original American 
intervention in South Vietnam and their advisory mission with the South Vietnamese forces 
waging a counterinsurgency against the Viet Cong was widely seen as legitimate by both 
Americans and South Vietnamese, and in particular enjoyed wide and broad support among the 
American public.52 However, a series of decisions were made by leaders at highest levels of 
American command, including sponsoring the coup which lead to the brutal assassination of 
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South Vietnamese President Ngoc, and at the lowest levels, such as the My Lai Massacre, which 
led to citizens of both the Republic of South Vietnam and the United States to view the United 
States as an illegitimate actor in South Vietnam, a shift in opinion which undercut the support for 
the American counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam both at home and abroad.53 Compounding 
this was the unpopular draft at home and the lack of clarity (addressed further below) about just 
exactly what the United States was doing in Vietnam in the first place. This loss of legitimacy 
brutally damaged the American cause in Vietnam and inevitably led to the Americans withdraw. 
       As has hopefully been made clear from the litany of disasters, dictatorial rule, coups, 
counter-coups, and general discontent, the government of Sierra Leone was rarely seen as 
legitimate by its own people. Indeed, Sierra Leone was classified as a failed state by a majority 
of political scientist and several international organizations in the late 1990s prior to the British 
intervention.54 However what is particularly interesting is that even before the invasion/rebellion 
and subsequent insurgency staged by the RUF there was a sense that Sierra Leone would become 
a failed state among Sierra Leonean academics and some Western political scientists.55 There 
was such heavy corruption in the government which people were quite familiar with for many 
years, and which eroded its support and legitimacy both at home and abroad. As the fighting 
continued through the 1990s the succession of governments which existed at this time continued 
to be seen as illegitimate. This started to change after the Lomé Peace Accords were signed in 
1999 and the democratically elected President Kabbah returned to Freetown.56 This history of 
poor government helped to make the British, though a former colonial power still always a 
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relatively good ally to Sierra Leone, appear to be even more legitimate in the eyes of many Sierra 
Leoneans.57  
 Domestically,  the British government under Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook had already set the stage when they came into government that they 
intended to use the military power of the nation in pursuit of an “ethical foreign policy,” which 
they immediately demonstrated by intervening in Bosnia and Serbia.58 This was a successful 
intervention, which both reassured the British electorate that this type of moral foreign policy 
could be effective and demonstrated that there was no ulterior motive to these ethnical 
interventions but that they were done as altruistic adventures. It may also have helped that Tony 
Blair had actually spent time in Sierra Leone personally and had a familial connection to the 
former Crown Colony, as his father had spent time as a schoolteacher there in the 1970s.59 Even 
today Tony Blair remains the most popular public figure in Sierra Leone and was hailed by the 
President of Sierra Leone as the savior of the nation.60 This background helped to build 
legitimacy for the British interventionary policy among the British public, and made it 
significantly less controversial than the invasion of Iraq, which though led and supported by the 
same group of New Labor policymakers and politicians lacked the same amount of legitimacy in 
the eyes of the British public. 
 Internationally, the British built support for their intervention as well. They were 
involved in the UN arms embargo (though this would cause some embarrassment later, as 
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discussed earlier) and condemned the atrocities being committed in Sierra Leone.61 They were 
also helped by the fact that the RUF was widely seen as being an illegitimate and criminal force 
both in-country and out-of-country, which meant that no one in the international community was 
inclined to speak out against the British intervening and sending in troops to put an end to them 
(unlike when Germany and Russia both spoke out against the United States sending in troops to 
Iraq for example, which undercut the legitimacy of that campaign from the very beginning).62 
 In Sierra Leone the British actually had something of an advantage from being the former 
colonial overlords. While colonialism was not a pretty chapter in the history of Africa, the 
British in Sierra Leone had a generally solid reputation among the people. It was in Freetown 
that the British had placed the slaves they freed, and there had been much British support of the 
process of independence and little conflict of the type that characterized decolonization 
throughout other parts of the Empire in Sierra Leone.63 This relatively positive past helped to 
increase British legitimacy in Sierra Leone as well. 
 It is practically impossible for an interventionary force to succeed at a counterinsurgency 
campaign if the host country government is not seen as legitimate. Fortunately in Sierra Leone 
by 2000 President Kabbah was seen as legitimate by much of the nation, a result of the relative 
fairness of the elections which brought him to power, his apparently sincere attempts to bring 
peace to the war weary nation, his own personal reputation as a decent individual who did not 
benefit as much as his predecessors from corruption, and the broad international support which 
he enjoyed.64  
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 In the United Kingdom there was a sense of support for the endeavor as well. The 
majority of British voters supported Blair’s decision to send in troops to restore order and put a 
permeant end to the violence. There had been what was dubbed a “BBC effect” (a play on the so-
called “CNN effect” which many speculated had led the United States into Somalia eight years 
earlier) and many people in Great Britain were outraged by the daily footage of the heinous 
crimes being committed in Sierra Leone.65  
 This was a major success point of the relatively rapid British victory once they committed 
to a counterinsurgency campaign alongside the Sierra Leonean Army. There was support at 
home so the British government did not feel constrained by the political calculus which would 
have limited them if there had not been such strong support at home, while the support for the 
Sierra Leonean government and the British military in Sierra Leone both undercut any attempts 
by the rebels to extend the fighting and gave the British a freer hand in operating within the 
country.  
 On the other hand the rebels violated the maxims of Che and Mao by acting in a manner 
which undercut their legitimacy in the eyes of both the people of Sierra Leone and the 
international community. Internationally their continued violation of ceasefires meant that no one 
was inclined to take their claims or grievances seriously, or mount any opposition to the British 
intervention.66  In Sierra Leone their cruel conduct towards the citizenry meant that they received 
little support from the people, who are supposed to be the lifeblood of any effective insurgency. 
Instead, their many atrocities made them incredibility unpopular in Sierra Leone, and by the end 
of the conflict they were reduced to kidnapping children to supply themselves with soldiers 
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because no one would willingly fight for them.67 This lack of legitimacy helped contribute to the 
RUF’s rapid downfall once the British Army arrived on the scene.  
Commitment 
 According to a study conducted by the RAND Corporation, the length of the average 
successful counterinsurgency is 14 years.68 In a day and age that prioritizes instant gratification 
and which sees the public getting live updates from the scene of every car bombing, every IED, 
and every ambushed convey, expecting a general public to endure 14 years with troops fighting 
the most difficult type of conflict overseas is, potentially, not realistic. However, if a successful 
counterinsurgency campaign is to be conducted than that commitment to stay long-term must be 
made. If it is not than the insurgents know that they simply need to engage in a waiting game; 
they are on their home turf and have the advantage in that situation. After all, the insurgents do 
not have to win to win, but merely force a stalemate which sees the intervening counterinsurgent 
forces withdraw. 
 The lack of a solid long-term commitment also might shift the center-of-gravity of the 
intervening power to their public approval ratings, as happened in the Vietnam War, which for 
insurgents and guerillas opens up the thought that a mass casualty assault might not militarily 
help the insurgents, but will damage the approval ratings of the counterinsurgency and its 
political leaders to such a degree that the intervening power will withdraw rather than continue 
the campaign. Two classic examples of this happening are the Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the 
Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia. 
 During the Tet Offensive the Viet Cong were effectively destroyed as a functional 
fighting force. The insurgents who had been battling the Americans for over a decade leading up 
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to Tet were completely crushed by the offensive, and the Viet Cong would no longer be an 
effective fighting force moving forward.69 In short, Tet was a resounding American victory on 
the battlefield.70 However, the lack of an American stomach for a continued commitment in 
Vietnam combined with the lack of legitimacy enjoined by the war already in both the United 
States and Vietnam meant that even the relatively small amount of Americans casualties lead to 
the American victory being viewed as an American defeat on the home front, and so this 
crushing American tactical triumph actually hastened the withdraw of American forces from 
Vietnam, and in the end was a stinging strategic defeat.71  
 The Black Hawk Down incident is another example of this factor of commitment at 
work. In Somalia the Americans won a military victory (at least in terms of casualties inflicted 
on the enemy versus those suffered) but lost their aura of invincibility and were seen on 
television as having failed miserably. This perception of American defeat was more damaging 
than an actual defeat might have been, and was one of the core factors in the early American exit 
from the region under President Clinton.72 The fact that the Americans were so unwilling to 
commit to the area and to the operation, and immediately withdraw upon suffering casualties, 
went a long way towards undermining American’s credibility in making commitments or threats. 
 On the other hand, the Columbian experience indicates that a long-term commitment to a 
counterinsurgency can eventually wear down the less well-equipped insurgents. In Columbia 
every President and significant political figure since 1964 has committed to crushing the FARC 
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Marxist insurgency, and just recently they have been forced to the negotiating table.73 Without 
that long-term commitment by the counterinsurgent leadership it is doubtful that this would have 
occurred. Without commitment, time is always on the side of the insurgent. 
 The British were significantly helped in Sierra Leone by the fact that the violent part of 
their counterinsurgency campaign was over within two years, and by 2002 much of the British 
military was able to withdraw. However, a deeper look at the record actually reveals an 
affirmation of the RAND Corporation’s analysis. The British government has spent millions of 
pounds in Sierra Leone in the last decade, and they have maintained a continuous military 
presence in their former colony since troops originally arrived in 2000.74  
 It is interesting to note the intention of the insurgent group West Side Boyz group to “do 
a Somalia” on the British and really test the commitment of Whitehall to Sierra Leone. Of course 
the Boyz were crushed in Operation: Barras, but the pitfalls of a lack of commitment are there to 
see. British commitment was not tested because of their swift victory, but in the years since 
British troops originally arrived the British have proven that they are committed to Sierra Leone 
and to ensuring that the peace achieved their through the British counterinsurgency efforts 
remains in place. Even when Ebola broke out in Sierra Leone in 2015 it was the U.K. who were 
the first state to assist the Sierra Leoneans.75 
  Commitment is a major factor in whether or not a counterinsurgency operation will 
succeed. If the counterinsurgents do not commit long-term to defeating the insurgency they 
potentially shift the center of gravity of the fickle public approval ratings of the war and 
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acknowledge that if the insurgents just hang on long enough their insurgency will succeed, 
strengthening the resolve of their opponent and undermining the counterinsurgent forces. 
Intellectual Understanding 
 As mentioned above, I fully embrace the notion that counterinsurgency is the graduate 
level of warfare. It is the thinking man’s war, so to speak, and so it requires deep thought and 
intellectual understanding at every level to be effective and successful, from the foot solider to 
the commander-in-chief. These six factors—Galula might call them the Six Laws—of 
counterinsurgency war are interrelated to a significant extent, but the triumvirate of restraint, 
clarity, and intellectual understanding are certainly the most interrelated of the bunch. This does 
not mean that a specific tactical doctrine must be adopted to succeed in counterinsurgency, but 
rather that a more general understanding that counterinsurgency both differs from conventional 
war but is still concerned with the art and science of warfare. If a state or military approaches 
counterinsurgency from either extreme and acts as if counterinsurgency is not at all unlike 
regular warfare, or that counterinsurgency is not at all a military affair but rather a civilian-
political one, they will almost assuredly fail. 
 Dating back to the heyday of the British Empire, from the magnificent reign of Queen 
Victoria up through the Second World War, the British Army has generally been regarded as 
among the foremost practitioners of counterinsurgency in the world.76 This is due, in large part, 
to necessity. The simple fact is that local revolts—typically coalescing into insurgencies and 
guerilla warfare—were guaranteed to happen with some frequency when a single empire covered 
a quarter of the globe, and they did. Whether it be fighting the Irish in one of a myriad of wars 
dating back to the days of Cromwell, subduing vast tracts of Western and Southern Africa during 
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the Age of Empire, or in more recent times putting down revolts in Malaysia, Kenya, Cyrus, and 
the Arabian Peninsula, the British Army has a long history of counterinsurgency operations.  
 For example, one of the most well-known and most emulated counterinsurgency 
operations in modern history was the campaign waged by the British Army against communist 
guerrillas in Malaysia in the 1950s. For years after the successful conclusion of this war by the 
British, counterinsurgency experts in nearly every nation, from Israel to the United States and 
France, have tried to glean insight from the tactics and strategies used in the Emergency. In fact, 
the American military simply copied the British “strategic hamlet” program of relocating the 
population base to more easily policed villages in Vietnam, though ineffectively and 
simplistically, and consequently in a way that failed miserably.77 The Malayan Emergency also 
brought into military lexicon the phrase “hearts and minds,” first uttered by the British 
commander for most of the conflict, General Sir Gerald Templar and also at some level imitated 
by the French in Algeria (unsuccessfully), the Americans in Afghanistan (conflict ongoing, but 
safe to say unsuccessfully) and which overall has generally become the standard motto 
counterinsurgency campaigns everywhere.78 
 The Emergency began when Communist guerillas infiltrated Malaysia in 1948, kicking 
off what would become a long-term (twelve-year) British operational commitment.79 The British 
developed highly-influential counterinsurgency concepts during this war, and the conflict is 
required study for anyone looking to understand future counter-insurgencies in the second half of 
the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first century. The majority of the specific 
individual tactics are not what concern this thesis, but rather the fact that the British had an 
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overall understanding of the type of conflict they were fighting and a coherent intellectual 
blueprint for how they wanted to win it. 
 The Americans focused on the wrong implementations used by the British in this conflict, 
preferring to zero in on the individual tactics the British used (“hearts and minds,” strategic 
hamlets) instead of the bigger picture strategy and thought processes. Malaysia and the 
Emergency was an example of British doctrine at work for two reasons: unification of command 
and minimum use of force. Unification of command was shown in that Templar had absolute 
authority over all British operation in Malaysia and reported in a clear chain of command which 
stretched unbroken directly to the Prime Minister, instead of branching off to several different 
government ministers.80 Minimum use of force was demonstrated by the intentional effort to use 
the least amount not only of British military personal necessary for the operation to succeed, but 
the minimum amount of violence needed as well. These played out in various ways tactically and 
which were suited to the environment (both cultural and physical) in which the campaign was 
being conducted, but every action undertaken by the British flowed out of them. 
 In Sierra Leone the British intellectual familiarity with and past experience of 
counterinsurgency was evident from the start. The initial operation was initially envisioned as 
purely one of evacuation (as addressed more in the clarity section) and the decision to embark 
upon an expeditionary counterinsurgency operation was not made until the troops had arrived in 
Sierra Leone.81 It is a testament to this culture of counterinsurgency that the British were able to 
pivot so effectively into a counterinsurgency operation, and such an effective one at that. In 
contrast, prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan doing something like this would have been 
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well-beyond the capabilities of the United States Army. The British Army had experience in 
foreign internal defense—the technical term for conducting training for foreign armies—which 
allowed them to quickly build up the Sierra Leonean Army and retrain it, turning into a 
competent force which in a short time was able to operate independently of its British allies.82 
Contrast that with the American attempts to train an Iraqi or Afghani army: while some Special 
Forces units were successful in bringing their counterparts up to snuff by and large the effort was 
an failure.83 
 This intellectual understanding of the proper way to conduct a counterinsurgency can also 
be seen in the example of how the British commander, General David Richards, interacted with 
Sierra Leonean President Kabbah. He treated him with the respect and dignity afforded an ally, 
and in a way which reassured the flighty leader, not a way which offended or alienated him.84 
This might seem a small thing, but from Vietnam to Algeria one of the chief reasons that 
counterinsurgency operations are derailed is that the commanders of the intervening force fail to 
properly interact with their counterparts in the host nation, with predictably poor results. That 
General Richards did not make this mistake is in many ways a testament to the strong culture of 
counterinsurgency within the British military. 
 Finally, it should be noted what influence the operations conducted by the British Army 
in Sierra Leone influenced British thinking during their decision making process in the lead up to 
the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the hallmarks of the British intervention in Sierra 
Leone, of course, was the commitment of ground troops to the intervention, as opposed to just 
using air strikes. Indeed, this in large part was due to the experience of Blair in the intervention 
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in Kosovo by NATO, where the Prime Minister felt that the airstrikes had little effect and 
observed that the civil war and genocide occurring in the former Yugoslavia did not come to a 
close until the Western powers moved beyond airstrikes and actually committed ground forces to 
the operation.85 Subsequently, when the commitment of ground forces in Sierra Leone led to 
such a dramatic success in such a short amount of time it was widely seen within the British 
political and military circles around the Prime Minister as proof of concept of his belief that the 
commitment of ground troops was not only effective, but also necessary for any humanitarian 
operation to succeed (of course the British did not have an event from the 1990s like the 
American Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia to tamper these beliefs).86 Consequently, when 
it came time to assist the Americans in their invasion of Iraq, Blair was confident not only in 
sending in British ground troops, but also in what the outcome would be due in large part to the 
influence on his thinking of the British success in Sierra Leone.87  
 One of the most common criticisms of the British Army since the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has been that these wars have proven that the intellectual knowledge and past 
experience of counterinsurgency campaigns have little to do with success in them. I disagree. 
The British and Americans in those two conflicts violated too many of these six factors to 
succeeded regardless of how much understanding of counterinsurgency and how much practice 
in it that they might have had. In both countries the geographic factors were against the 
intervening nations, with the mountains of Afghanistan providing sanctuary to insurgents, and, 
more importantly, Iran and Pakistan providing insurgents with a fairly untouchable safe haven 
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for training and rearming safe from allied airpower.88 In both conflicts there was a distinct lack 
of clarity as to what the plan was once the initial invasion was accomplished, and obviously 
extreme doubts about legitimacy, especially in Iraq.89 Finally, there was no real thought to a 
long-term commitment; instead the decade long occupation of Iraq was appears to be a result not 
of planning but of inertia.90 With those circumstances considered it is little wonder that the 
coalition forces failed to achieve victory in either Iraq or Afghanistan, regardless of the fact that 
the British Army had such a long and proud tradition of counterinsurgency experience and 
theory. Instead, they achieved the result that should be expected in a counterinsurgency 
campaign when these six factors are ignored: abject defeat.  
 The Americans do not lack an intellectual background in counterinsurgency so much as 
actively seek to obscure and ignore their counterinsurgency background. In the late 1990s the 
official term for counterinsurgency-like operations in the U.S. Army was MOOTWAH, or 
Military Operations Other Than War, often referred to as “moot-wah.” It was a less than popular 
concept within the American military. In the early 1990s the Chief of Staff of the Army summed 
up the feelings of many when he derisively declared that “Real men don’t do moot-wah.”  91 This 
might be because recent American counterinsurgency record is especially dismal. From Vietnam 
to Afghanistan to Iraq, the United States has consistently failed to successfully combat 
insurgencies over a long period of time. The United States has also demonstrated a proclivity for 
being drawn in to fighting them, a fact that highlights the necessity for the U.S. to develop 
effective counterinsurgency initiatives and tactics. Even with the withdrawal from Iraq under 
President Barak Obama the potential for American involvement with a large scale insurgency in 
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the next ten years is high: the emergence of the Islamic State in the Middle East and Boko Harem 
in West Africa, as well as Russian-backed insurgencies in the Republic of Georgia and in the 
Ukraine, and the continuing deterioration of rule of law in places like Libya almost guarantee 
that the United States will be fighting another counterinsurgency campaign soon.  
 A strong intellectual background with counterinsurgency is crucial to ensuring that the 
entire framework of a campaign is designed correctly, that soldiers and commanders 
implementing the other factors which are their responsibility (namely restraint), and that 
legitimacy is maintained and that clarity is ensured.  
Restraint 
 Last year one U.S. presidential candidate said that he would deal with an opponent in the 
Middle East in following manner: “We will carpet-bomb them into oblivion. I don’t know if sand 
can glow in the dark, but we’re going to find out!”92 That approach might work against a 
conventional massed force, but would represent a disaster when applied to a counterinsurgency 
campaign. As discussed earlier legitimacy is a crucial factor in waging a successful 
counterinsurgency effort and one of the quickest ways to undermine legitimacy is by killing 
civilians or appearing to act in a manner which is heavy-handed or indiscriminate. The phrase 
“collateral damage” is one which in an ideal setting would never appear in an insurgency. The 
writers of the U.S. Army’s latest counterinsurgency manual included a series of paradoxes in the 
original version of that document which do a good job of framing the proper mindset, with the 
proper reaction to the idea that collateral damage being described as “Sometimes doing nothing 
is the best reaction.”93 The idea of hearts and minds is intrinsically related to this factor of 
restraint. As discussed in a previous chapter this phrase is oft-uttered by American military and 
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political leaders when referring to what is occurring in Iraq or to what the United States 
attempted to do in Vietnam, but they all too often misuse it and misunderstand it.  
 In counterinsurgency campaigns an economy of force should be used. In large part as a 
result of their colonial experience the British have almost always attempted to use the lowest 
amount of force necessary to achieve the desired result of their interventions and 
counterinsurgency campaigns, and rely as much as possible on friendly local governments and 
militaries. Referred to oftentimes as the ‘indirect approach,’ this has been the British technique 
dating back to the height of their imperium.94 Things were no different in Sierra Leone, where 
the British Army relied heavily on both the Sierra Leonean Army and the Kamajor militias to 
conduct patrols and operations against the holdout RUF insurgents.  
 This reliance on foreign allies and focus on the economy of force, however, stands in 
some contrast to the basic tenets of the American way of war. The United States has possessed a 
technological and material advantage in every conflict which it has fought since the Second 
World War. This has lead America to possess a massive threat deterrence as well as an aversion 
to waging what Weigley refers to as “limited wars.”95 This large-scale advantage has led to a 
culture of war which is uniquely American, as first discussed by historian Russell Weigley in his 
seminal work The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy. According to Weigley and borne out by other studies of American approaches to 
conflicts, the United States prefers to use its massive advantages in firepower, technology, and 
material to destroy an enemy in the most spectacular way possible while doing everything in its 
power to preserve American and civilian lives: thus the American preference for strategic 
                                                          
94 Huw Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-insurgency in the Kenya Emergency (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 43. 
95 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), 413. 
54 
 
 
 
bombing in the Second World War (a preference continued into Vietnam and Iraq, and today 
against ISIS) rather than actually committing ground troops.96 When ground troops are 
committed to an intervention this doctrine can easily lead to the build-up of bases and troops 
formations in country and an over-reliance on air power, two hallmarks of the major use of force 
which is indicative of a potentially failed counterinsurgency campaign. This is especially true for 
an American strategic model that takes the division (apx. 20,000 soldiers) as the building block 
of its planning and has a noted lack of flexibility in its thinking.97 Instead, the United States and 
other would be intervening states needs to borrow from the British and, at least in 
counterinsurgency campaigns, get away from this approach of overwhelming force and inflexible 
thinking to embrace innovation, something which cannot exist if its existence and prior 
experience is not considered.  
 Counterinsurgent commanders and policymakers should use as little troops as possible 
and, try avoiding the buildup of massive infrastructure and bases like the Americans did in 
Saigon in Vietnam and Camp Bagram in Iraq, and stay away from a constant barrage of gunship 
assaults and drone strikes, instead focusing on utilizing the minimum force necessary to achieve 
the desired end-state, preferably with as much use of allied troops from the country the campaign 
is being conducted in as possible. Restraint flows from clarity, enhances legitimacy, and 
demands intellectual understanding. 
Clarity 
 Political scientist Robert Jervis wrote a famous article entitled “War and Misperception” 
several decades ago in which he made a case that nearly all wars involve a strong element of 
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misperception of capabilities, either about one’s own nation or the opponent.98 This could easily 
be whittled down a maxim that all failed counterinsurgencies involve a strong sense of 
misperception, typically a misperception that the counterinsurgency effort will not be necessary 
because an insurgency is unlikely to occur, and that therefore no planning should be done to 
account for one. Galula harps on the importance of having an accurate perception of both one’s 
own forces and one’s opponents and the importance of accurate intelligence in 
Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice, as does Clausewitz in On War.99 
 A textbook example of this kind of ‘if we do not plan for an insurgency it will never 
happen’ ostrich head-in-the-sand type of thinking can readily be found in the United States’ 
plans for post-invasion/post-Saddam Iraq. As Kaplan reports, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld “didn’t plan for the postwar because he didn’t want a postwar...it wasn’t an oversight; 
it was deliberate.”100 
 I entitled this factor clarity because at the most basic level it must be clear to all primary 
players that a plan for a counterinsurgency is necessary, and furthermore that plan must be fully 
clear to everyone who has a stake in its success. Indeed, the first thing that must be done is to 
acknowledge that a counterinsurgency campaign is likely to occur in the event of an intervention, 
and plan accordingly. This sounds painfully obvious, but it has been painfully illustrated time 
and again that it is not at all obvious. Both President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld ignored the 
warning signs that an insurgency could potentially develop in Iraq—and to a lesser extent in 
Afghanistan—and the price for this ignorance was paid in American blood.101 Strategists must 
realize from the outset that an insurgency will be fought, and from the moment the intervening 
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nation’s troops’ boots hit the ground a clear plan must in place to start neutralizing the 
insurgency. In Sierra Leone this meant that as soon as the British forces arrived they were 
moving to facilitate Sierra Leonean pacification of the rebels and engaging in civil relations 
campaigns, instead of just focusing on direct military action as the Americans did in Iraq, where 
generals and policymakers blithely assumed that direct military action was all that would be 
required to conclude the conflict.102  
 Likewise, if any counterinsurgency (or really an operation military or otherwise) is to be 
successful, a clear chain-of-command must be in place. Again this appears obvious, but is 
something which many counterinsurgents have failed at, as the Americans and French both did 
in Vietnam and Americans did in the first half of the intervention in Iraq. In British Malaysia 
full-command of both the civil and military operations was put in the hands of Sir Gerald 
Templar, allowing a cohesive and ordered vison to be imposed on the chaos which an insurgency 
invariably creates.103 In Sierra Leone General David Richards possessed de facto carte blanche 
to execute a counterinsurgency operation while reporting directly to the highest levels of the 
British government, again giving the British troops involved a clear sense of objectives and goals 
and putting all stakeholders on the same page.104 In Iraq, on the other hand, the American 
command structure was an absolute disaster. There was a general in charge of the military forces 
in the country and another general in charge of the overall theatre (Central Command), both who 
would issue orders and set goals in-country. This overlap of command led to political infighting 
and a lack of clarity among the commanding generals and their staffs, and it was further 
compounded by the fact that the military leaders were technically subservient to the convoluted 
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civilian chain of command, which included the Ambassador to Iraq, the Secretary of State, and 
Vice President Cheney, all giving separate orders to the military commanders involved through 
separate channels.105 In other words, it was a complicated mess that failed to ever produce a clear 
plan or vision for what a successful end-state in Iraq would look like or how to achieve that 
vision. Consequently, the British were successful where the Americans were not. 
 Finally, there must be a clear plan and goal to be in place for what the desired end-state 
of the intervention and counterinsurgency campaign is. The British in Malaysia, Kenya, and 
Sierra Leone had a clear sense of what they desired the country to look at after the intervention. 
The United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, on the other hand, never moved beyond buzzwords 
like ‘stable democracy’ without any measurable goals or objectives. This led to doubling down 
on the confusion caused by the lack of clarity in command and led to ineffective communication 
on the battlefield. If a counterinsurgency campaign is going to succeed, a clear end-state must be 
stated before the campaign is ever underway. 
 An example of this is trying to figure out how to deal with former insurgents when the 
conflict starts to turn against them, or if the government has been toppled in an earlier 
intervention how to incorporate members of the former ruling elite and military into the post-
conflict society (if they are not incorporated an insurgency is very likely). Nearly every British 
counterinsurgency campaign, from Cyrus to Aden to Sierra Leone, had some sort of program in 
place to encourage insurgents to become either informants or leave the battlefield altogether.106 
There has to be real clarity in this area and a clear plan in place for turning insurgents into allies, 
or at least peaceful civilians. If there is no inducement for benefit for the insurgents to lay down 
their arms, why would they do so?  
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 America has not been nearly so effective with these types of programs, largely due to a 
lack of clarity. The Phoenix Program existed to do something along these lines in Vietnam, but 
was run by the CIA, not the Army, was very secretive, and was not done nearly on a large 
enough scale to be truly effective anyway.107 In Iraq one of the first moves the United States 
made after the capture of Baghdad was to disband both the ruling Ba’ath political party and the 
military, and to outlaw anyone who had been in either organization—and make no mistake, these 
two organizations formed the core institutions of Iraqi society—from ever serving in government 
positions again. The best part of this foolish order though was that even today no one is quite 
sure who issued it.108 That is a lack of clarity at its finest. Not only did this blunder create a 
massive pool of readily available and motivated individuals for the insurgency which was about 
to break out, but it also disincentivized these individuals from ever working with or for the 
Americans, undercutting the American counterinsurgency operations and intelligence gathering 
apparatus before said apparatus was even created. In both Iraq and Afghanistan the Americans 
not only did a poor job of managing what the post-conflict environment would look like, they 
had “no overall strategy” for after their invasions at all.109 Again in Afghanistan this lack of any 
clear plan would come back to bite the Americans, who were spread thin around the country and 
had not expected to triumph over the Taliban so quickly. Indeed the Americans barely realized 
that the Northern Alliance was in large-part an Iranian-backed organization and not all that 
aligned with American priorities.110 Thus the Americans were left scrambling after their victory 
and installed a President of Afghanistan in Hamid Karzai who even to this day has been a thorn 
in their side and an impediment to victory. They had no plan as to what they would do, so they 
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just did the first thing that seemed available (install the leader of their supposed allies the 
Northern Alliance as president) and went from there, with poor results. 
 Clarity is absolutely necessary for a successful counterinsurgency to be waged. All 
stakeholders from the privates in the trenches to the generals in the command centers and the 
diplomats in the embassies must be onboard and completely clear both on what is going on and 
what their role in the larger plan and goal is. Counterinsurgency, more so than even conventional 
warfare, requires a coordinated effort, and that is only possible if the crucial factor of clarity is 
emphasized appropriately.  
Geographic and Geopolitical Factors 
 Geographic and geopolitical factors are out of control of most intervening forces control. 
However, they may be the number one indicator for whether or not a counterinsurgency 
campaign will be successful or is foreordained to doom from the start.  In one of the foundational 
texts of current U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, French Colonel David Galula’s 
Counterinsurgency Warfare,  the author says that one of the perquisites for an insurgency to 
succeed is for there to be a neighboring state which offers the insurgents safe haven.111 
Conversely, one of the perquisites for a successful insurgency to be waged is to ensure that no 
such state is in place. In Afghanistan the Americans were constantly thwarted by Pakistan 
offering the Taliban and Al-Qaeda safe haven; in South Vietnam North Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia all fulfilled the same function for the Viet Cong; in Rhodesia the insurgents could flee 
the Rhodesian commandos for the relative sanctuary of Mozambique.112  
 The British in Sierra Leone, conversely, had little to fear in this regard. Liberia had 
served this safe haven function for the RUF for quite some time, but Liberian President Charles 
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Taylor, the longtime primary supporter of the RUF, was facing rebellion in Liberia as well as 
large amounts of external pressure to discontinue his support of the RUF, and by the time the 
British arrived in Sierra Leone Liberia was no longer fulfilling this function for the rebels. Even 
better for the British counterinsurgents was that the only other sovereign state which borders 
Sierra Leone, Guinea, was actively at war with the RUF and had defeated them in a series of 
battles already.113 Instead of finding aid across the borders the RUF was actually constrained by 
them, which put major pressure on the insurgents. If a counterinsurgent force can trap the 
insurgents within the limited geographical boundaries of the nation in which the campaign is 
being waged and cut them off from outside aid, the odds of success increase exponentially.  
 The other part of this factor of geography—and one that is somewhat less crucial, but still 
important—is physical geography. An insurgency can thrive in any terrain, but is especially 
helped but mountains (such as in Afghanistan), dense jungle (such as Vietnam), or even vast 
open deserts (Iraq). Urban insurgencies are also becoming more common, but the geographic 
enclosure that is the modern metropolis limits the effectiveness of the urban guerilla today.114 
The geography of Sierra Leone is actually quite conducive to an insurgency. It is a thick jungle 
region located just above the equator, and would be a prime place to stage an insurgency in.115 
Indeed, the RUF had done just that for the last several years, using jungle bases as staging 
grounds from which to invade different parts of the country, and launching ambush after ambush 
against government troops sent against them.116 If the British were not seen as legitimate and did 
not have the backing of the local government and military they would have been at much more 
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of a disadvantage due to this physical geography. However, they were and they did, and those 
fact alone helped to neutralize the disadvantage of the territory which they were operating in.  
Again, the geopolitical and physical geography of a host nation is of the utmost importance in 
determining whether or not a counterinsurgency will succeed. Both Clausewitz and Galula speak 
directly to primacy of this factor.117 This must be recognized from the outset, and if these factors 
are not conducive to success the intervening nation must truly consider the matter before 
deciding to commit troops, because like demography in politics geography in counterinsurgency 
is destiny. If the decision is made to commit troops anyway than it is of crucial importance that 
the host nation government be legitimate and have a force which can operate within the 
challenging geographic territory that the insurgent is utilizing as a stronghold, serving as guides 
and scouts for the typically more conventional intervening nation’s forces. An excellent example 
of this is the use of Arab auxiliaries by T.E. Lawrence in his battles with the Turks, as well as the 
use of Hmong irregulars by the United States during the Vietnamese War, and the British 
alliance with the Kamajors in Sierra Leone.118 Additionally, if there are neighboring countries 
willing to provide aid to the insurgents than a state about to embark on a counterinsurgency must 
be prepared to interdict that aid by force, and if necessary to invade the neighboring state. If an 
intervening nation is not willing to take these steps it is better to not get involved at all, because 
it will be pointless to do battle with an insurgent group whose base can never be neutralized and 
who know that they can thus continue the struggle indefinitely.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONCLUSION 
 This paper has considered the six primary factors which must be in place for a 
counterinsurgency campaign to be successful, discussed and illustrated within the context of the 
British intervention into Sierra Leone. These six factors are legitimacy, clarity, 
geographic/geopolitical factors, restraint, intellectual understanding, and commitment.  
Legitimacy refers to the counterinsurgency campaign (and potential intervention by a foreign 
power into a host nation) being seen as legitimate by the citizens of the nation intervening as 
well as those of the host nation and the international community. Clarity refers to the goals and 
objectives of the intervention being clear to policymakers and military commanders (and 
hopefully to citizens) and the strategies and tactics which are to be used being clear to soldiers at 
every level. A clear plan must be in place and a single goal must be being worked toward. 
Geographic/Geopolitical factors primarily refers to the necessity of making sure that the 
insurgents are isolated on the world stage and do not have a friendly nation which they can use as 
a base and place to resupply and train, and secondarily to the physical geography of the location 
where the insurgency is taking place. Restraint refers to the need for the 
intervening/counterinsurgency forces to exercise strict self-control as they battle the insurgency. 
A priority must be placed on avoiding civilian casualties and the words ‘collateral damage’ 
cannot be uttered approvingly in any situation. Intellectual understanding involves organizational 
culture and understanding of the demanding nature of counterinsurgency warfare, and an 
understanding of the basic underpinnings of what constitutes a successful counterinsurgency 
campaign and the techniques and strategies therein. Finally, a successful counterinsurgency 
campaign demands that the counterinsurgents are committed for the long haul, and that they will 
not be dissuaded in their goal of defeating the insurgency. It takes over a decade on average to 
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defeat an insurgency, and if the counterinsurgents are unwilling to explicitly make this 
commitment and make it known to all that they have done so the insurgents will be emboldened 
and strengthened, secure in the knowledge that all they have to do to win is not lose. 
Future Areas of Research 
Future research in this area has several possibilities. One, and most obvious, is simply to 
consider that other factors might be more important than the ones that are identified here. Areas 
of disagreement might include whether certain political structures are better suited to waging a 
counterinsurgency, what economic or what role societal/cultural factors potentially play. Another 
area is to consider how militaries which might have never waged a counterinsurgent campaign 
before have fared in doing so. If they have fared at a comparable level to the British military 
especially it might be a sign that intellectual understanding and past counterinsurgency 
experience is not as important a factor as I initially have stated. One could also explore the 
importance of restraint, which I place primary importance on; some have argued that the 
opposite is needed and that the most successful counterinsurgency will instead be ‘scorched-
earth’ in nature.  
Final Statement 
 In this project I have attempted to draw upon extensive counterinsurgency literature and 
several historical cases to draw out the dominant and most crucial factors to the success or failure 
of a counterinsurgency campaign. The factors which I identified through my research are 
legitimacy, clarity, geographical and geopolitical factors, restraint, intellectual understanding and 
experience, and an enduring commitment. With these factors in place commanders and 
policymakers can fairly expect to, with time, defeat an insurgency and triumph in the most 
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challenging and demanding form of warfare humans engage in. Without these six factors in place 
counterinsurgency commanders can expect little more than defeat, disgrace, and abject failure.  
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